Joel on Software

Strategy Letter I: Ben and Jerry's vs. Amazon

战略来信一：本杰瑞 vs 亚马逊

by Joel Spolsky Friday, May 12, 2000

Building a company? You've got one very important decision to make, because it affects everything else you do. No matter what else you do, you absolutely must figure out which camp you're in, and gear everything you do accordingly, or you're going to have a disaster on your hands.

想要创立一个公司？不过在这之前，有一个很重要的决定你肯定要做，因为这个决定影响了其他所有事情。不管你如何处理其他事情，你绝对首先得弄清楚你自己属于哪种模式？然后据此调整你所做的每一件事情。否则，到头来你肯定搞得手忙脚乱。

The decision? Whether to grow slowly, organically, and profitably, or whether to have a big bang with very fast growth and lots of capital.

那么这到底是个什么样的决定呢？就是：是增长得慢一点呢？是在保持盈利的状态下有机式的缓缓增长呢？还是采用积聚资本然后大爆炸似的迅速发展模式。

The organic model is to start small, with limited goals, and slowly build a business over a long period of time. I'm going to call this the Ben and Jerry's model, because Ben and Jerry's fits this model pretty well.

有机增长模型是指：从小公司开始，限定好目标。然后在很长的一段时间内慢慢构建公司的业务。我把这种模式叫本杰瑞模式，因为本和杰瑞能很好的适应这个模式。

The other model, popularly called "Get Big Fast" (a.k.a. "Land Grab"), requires you to raise a lot of capital, and work as quickly as possible to get big fast without concern for profitability. I'm going to call this theAmazon model, because Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon, has practically become the celebrity spokesmodel for Get Big Fast.

另外一种模式。通常会被叫做“快速变大”（即“圈地”模式）这种模式需要你募集大量的资本，然后尽可能快地将企业自身发展壮大，而不需要担心有关盈利的问题。我把这种模式叫做亚马逊模式，因为马逊的创始人杰夫贝索思亚基本上就是这种快速变大模式的明星发言人。

Let's look at some of the differences between these models. The first thing to ask is: are you going into a business that has competition, or not?

让我们来看看这两种模式之间的一些差别，首先要问的问题就是：你是否要进入一个有竞争的行业。

If you don't have any real competition, like Amazon, there is a chance that you can succeed at a "land grab", that is, get as many customers as quickly as possible, so that later competitors will have a serious barrier to entry. But if you're going into an industry where there is already a well-established set of competitors, the land-grab idea doesn't make sense. You need to create your customer base by getting customers to switch over from competitors.

如果像亚马逊一样你并没有什么真实的竞争对手的话。那么很有可能你会在圈地模式下取得成功。也就是尽可能快的获取大量客户，给后来进入的竞争者造成巨大的进入门槛。但是如果你要进入的是一个已经有大量老牌竞争者的行业。那么圈地模式就根本行不通。你得让客户从其他的竞争者慢慢的转移到你这边来，得通过这样的方式来构建起你的用户群。

In general, venture capitalists aren't too enthusiastic about the idea of going into a market with pesky competitors. Personally, I'm not so scared of established competition; perhaps because I worked on Microsoft Excel during a period when it almost completely took over Lotus 123, which virtually had the market to themselves. The number one word processor, Word, displaced WordPerfect, which displaced WordStar, all of which had been near monopolies at one time or another. And Ben and Jerry's grew to be a fabulous business, even though it's not like you couldn't get ice cream before they came along. It's not impossible to displace a competitor, if that's what you want to do. (I'll talk about how to do that in a future Strategy Letter).

基本上，风险投资不会热衷于这样一种创业理念。这种创业理念通常会是要进入一个已经有很多烦人竞争者的市场。就个人而言我不是很害怕有竞争，可能是因为我工作的微软Excel在那个时代完全打败了Lotus123，而Lotus123在那个时代基本上垄断了整个市场。世界第一的文字处理器word取代了wordperfect，Wordperfect相应取代了wordstar。所有这些被取代的产品在那个年代几乎都曾一个接一个的占据着市场的垄断地位，最后本和杰瑞却成长成了一流的公司。这种情况并不像是说，在这家公司诞生之前你们就没办法尝到甜头。只要你愿意，肯定是有办法取代竞争者的。（我会在未来的战略来信中谈论这个问题）

Another question about displacing competitors has to do with network effects and lock-in:

关于取代竞争者的另外一个问题就是：网络效应和锁定效应。

A "network effect" is a situation where the more customers you have, the more customers you will get. It's based on Metcalfe's Law: the value of a network is equal to the number of users squared.

强大的客户锁定效应 “网络效应”是指在这种情况下，你现在的客户越多你未来的客户就越多。这种现象源于MetCalfe定律：网络的价值等于网络中用户数量的平方。

A good example is eBay. If you want to sell your old Patek Philippe watch, you're going to get a better price on eBay, because there are more buyers there. If you want to buy a Patek Philippe watch, you're going to look on eBay, because there are more sellers there.

一个经典的例子就是ebay。如果你想卖掉你的旧Patek飞利浦手表的话，你在ebay上肯定能卖个好价钱， 因为那里有更多的买家。 同样的道理，如果你要买飞利浦Patek手表的话，你最好也去ebay，因为那里有更多的卖家。

Another extremely strong network effect is proprietary chat systems like ICQ or AOL Instant Messenger. If you want to chat with people, you have to go where they are, and ICQ and AOL have the most people by far. Chances are, your friends are using one of those services, not one of the smaller ones like MSN Instant Messenger. With all of Microsoft's muscle, money, and marketing skill, they are just not going to be able to break into auctions or instant messaging, because the network effects there are so strong.

另一个超强网络效应的例证就是所有的聊天系统，就像ICQ，AOL即时通讯。 如果你想找人聊天，那么你就得去人多的地方。而ICQ和AOL有着目前最多的在线聊天人群。很有可能你的朋友们也在使用这些产品，而不是例如MSN这样的即时通讯。虽然有着微软的力量，资金以及销售技能，他们还是没有办法进入在线拍卖和即时通讯领域，原因就是网络效应是如此之强。

"Lock-in" is where there is something about the business that makes people not want to switch. Nobody wants to switch their Internet provider, even if the service isn't very good, because of the hassle of changing your email address and notifying everyone of the new email address. People don't want to switch word processors if their old files can't be read by the new word processor.

“锁定效应”是指商业中的某样东西让人们不想去更换。比如人们不愿更换他们的因特网接入提供商，哪怕服务不是很好。这主要是因为更换服务商会带来的一系列麻烦，比如说：更换你的email地址，通知所有人。再比如说，如果新的文字处理器不能够处理他们的旧文档的话，人们不会愿意接受使用新的文字处理器。

Even better than lock-in is the sneaky version I call stealth lock-in: services which lock you in without your even realizing it. For example, all those new services like PayMyBills.com which receive your bills for you, scan them in, and show them to you on the Internet. They usually come with three months free service. But when the three months are up, if you don't want to continue with the service, you have no choice but to contact every single bill provider and ask them to change the billing address back to your house. The sheer chore of doing this is likely to prevent you from switching away from PayMyBills.com -- better just to let them keep sucking $8.95 out of your bank account every month. Gotcha!

有一种比锁定效应更好的一种偷偷摸摸的版本锁定效应，我称之为隐身锁定状态。就是那些已经将你锁定，但是你却还没有意识到的那些服务。比如像PayMyBills.com提供的新服务：首先他们会帮你接收账单，然后扫描这些账单并通过因特网把账单显示给你看。他们通常会先提供一个三个月的免费服务期，但是当三个月结束后，如果你不想继续使用这项服务，你就只好挨个联系所有帐单提供商让他们把账单寄回你的住宅地址。这种做法纯粹就是为了避免你不用PayMyBills.com – 从而选择让他们每个月都从你的银行账户里面吸走8.95$，知道了吧！

If you are going into a business that has natural network effects and lock-in, and there are no established competitors, then you better use the Amazon model, or somebody else will, and you simply won't be able to get a toehold.

如果你要进入的行业有自然的网络效应和锁定效应，并且没有既定的竞争者，那么你最好就使用亚马逊模式。否则其他人就会使用这种模式。而到时候你就没有立足之地了。

Quick case study. In 1998, AOL was spending massively to grow at a rate of a million customers every five weeks. AOL has nice features like chat rooms and instant messaging that provide stealth lock-in. Once you've found a group of friends you like to chat with, you are simply not going to switch Internet providers. That's like trying to get all new friends. In my mind that's the key reason that AOL can charge around $22 a month when there are plenty of $10 a month Internet providers.

很快地看一个案例。1998年，AOL花费了大量的资金换来每五周百万客户的增长速度。AOL有着很好的功能例如聊天室和即时通讯。这些功能提供了那种隐身锁定效应。一旦你建立了一群喜欢聊天的好朋友，那么你就不会更换因特网提供商。因为那意味着你要重新尝试去建立所有这些新朋友。在我看来，这就是虽然当时有大量一个月只收十美元的因特网服务提供商的时候，AOL却能够每个月能够向用户收取22美元费用的主要原因。

While I was working at Juno, management just failed to understand this point, and they missed their best opportunity to overtake AOL during a land rush when everyone was coming online: they didn't spend strongly enough on customer acquisition because they didn't want to dilute existing shareholders by raising more capital, and they didn't think strategically about chat and IM, so they never developed any software features to provide the kind of stealth lock-in that AOL has. Now Juno has around 3 million people paying them an average of $5.50 a month, while AOL has around 21 million people paying them an average of $17 a month. "Oops."

当我在Juno工作的时候，管理层却不能够明白这一点。 在圈地运动的鼎盛时期，所有人都想上网的时候，他们失去了超过AOL的绝佳机会：他们不想在获取客户资源上投入大量资金，因为他们不想通过更多的举债来稀释现有股东权利，并且他们也从来没有从战略角度来考虑过聊天和即时通讯。因此他们也从来没有开发过任何软件功能来提供AOL所有的这种隐身锁定效应。因此，Juno有三百万个用户每月付费5.5$的时候，AOL有大约两千一百万用户每月支付17$。“惨了”

Ben and Jerry's companies start on somebody's credit card. In their early months and years, they have to use a business model that becomes profitable extremely quickly, which may not be the ultimate business model that they want to achieve. For example, you may wantto become a giant ice cream company with $200,000,000 in annual sales, but for now, you're going to have to settle for opening a little ice cream shop in Vermont, hope that it's profitable, and, if it is, reinvest the profits to expand business steadily. The Ben and Jerry's corporate history says they started with a $12,000 investment. ArsDigita says that they started with an $11,000 investment. These numbers sound like a typical MasterCard credit limit. Hmmm.

本杰瑞的公司可以可以用某人的信用卡创立，在公司初创的几个月和几年里。他们得使用一种能够迅速盈利的商业模式。这种商业模式不必是他们最终想要达成的那种最终的商业模式。比方说：你可能想要成为一个年销售21亿美元的冰淇淋巨头。但是一开始，你可能得先在Vertmont开一个小小的冰激凌店，希望这个商店能够盈利。如果确实盈利了的话，可能把利润用来持续的扩张新生意。本杰瑞公司的历史表明他们初始投资为12000美元，ArsDigita说他们的初始投资为11000美元，恩，这些数字听起来像是一张万事达卡的透支上限。

Amazon companies raise money practically as fast as anyone can spend it. There's a reason for this. They are in a terrible rush. If they are in a business with no competitors and network effects, they better get big super-fast. Every day matters. And there are lots of ways to substitute money for time (see sidebar). Nearly all of them are fun.

亚马逊类的公司以人们最快的那种花钱的速度募集资金，这里面是有一个原因的，因为他们的时间非常紧急，如果他们所在的行业有着网络效应却没有竞争者，那么他们最好迅速变大，每一天都至关重要。有很多种方式可以实现以钱换时间（见侧栏），而且所有的这些方式都很有趣。

Ways to substitute money for time:

以钱换时间的方式。

• Use prebuilt, furnished executive offices instead of traditional office space. Cost: about 3 times as much. Time saved: several months to a year, depending on market.

• Pay outrageous salaries or offer programmers BMWs as starting bonuses. Cost: about 25% extra for technical staff. Time saved: you can fill openings in 3 weeks instead of the more typical 6 months.

• Hire consultants instead of employees. Cost: about 3 times as much. Time saved: you can get consultants up and running right away.

• Having trouble getting your consultants to give you the time and attention you need? Bribe them with cash until they only want to work> for you.

• Spend cash freely to spot-solve problems. If your new star programmer isn't getting a lot of work done because they are busy setting up their new house and relocating, hire a high class relocation service to do it for them. If it's taking forever to get phones installed in your new offices, buy a couple of dozen cellular phones. Internet access problems slowing people down? Just get two redundant providers. Provide a concierge available to all employees for picking up dry cleaning, getting reservations, arranging for limos to the airport, etc.

• 采用精装的办公室而不是那种毛坯的办公空间。

• 花费：大概是原来的三倍。

• 时间节省：节省了几个月到一年的时间。具体节省程度跟相应的市场有关。

• 给程序员支付大笔的薪水，或者给程序员提供宝马作为签约奖金。

• 花费：为技术人员多花了大约25%。

• 时间节省：可以在三周之内填补空缺职位，而不是一般意义下的六个月。

• 雇用顾问而不是全职人员。

• 花费:大约多了三倍。

• 时间节省:你可以让顾问马上开始工作。

• 在让顾问集中时间专注于你所需要的工作上面遇到了麻烦？用钱贿赂他们吧！直到他们只想为你工作。

• 自由地花钱来解决各种会出现的问题。程序员没有能够完成很多工作，因为他们忙着要搬家和搞定自己的新房子。那么雇一个高端的搬家公司来帮他们做这些事情。如果新办公室里的电话永远也装不好的话，那就买几堆手机吧。因特网接入减慢了大家的进度？那就用两个冗余的因特网提供商吧！为所有的员工提供门房服务：负责接送，清洗，预定，安排林肯加长轿车到机场接送。

Ben and Jerry's companies just can't afford to do this, so they have to settle for growing slowly.

本杰瑞公司不可能付得起这么多钱。所以他们必须得慢慢的增长。

When you are growing faster than about 100% per year, it is simply impossible for mentors to transmit corporate values to new hires. If a programmer is promoted to manager and suddenly has 5 new reports, hired just yesterday, it is simply impossible for there to be very much mentoring. Netscape is the most egregious example of this, growing from 5 to about 2000 programmers in one year. As a result, their culture was a mishmash of different people with different values about the company, all tugging in different directions.

当你以100%的增长速度发展公司的时候。导师根本无法把公司文化传授给新雇员工。如果一个程序员被晋升为程序经理，然后突然开始带五个昨天新招进来的下属，他也根本不太可能有太多的时间来指导他们。网景就是这种情况的最佳佐证。他在一年内从五个员工发展到大概有两千多个程序员。他们的企业文化就是：一对有着不同公司价值观的人搀杂在一起形成的企业文化。所有的人都朝着不同方向发展。

For some companies, this might be OK. For other companies, the corporate culture is an important part of the raison-d'être of the company. Ben and Jerry's exists because of the values of the founders, who would not accept growing faster than the rate at which that culture can be promulgated.

对一些公司来说这可能是行不通的，但是对另外一些公司来讲公司文化就是他们公司存在的理由。本杰瑞公司存在的理由就是他们创始人的价值观。他们不会接受这种情况下的快速发展，这种情况假设公司文化只需要颁布出来就行了。

Let's take a hypothetical software example. Suppose you want to break into the market for word processors. Now, this market seems to be pretty sewn up by Microsoft, but you see a niche for people who, for whatever reason, absolutely cannot have their word processors crashing on them. You are going to make a super-robust, industrial strength word processor that just won't go down and sell it at a premium to people who simply depend on word processors for theirlives. (OK, it's a stretch. I said this was a hypothetical example).

让我们举一个虚构软件案例。假设你要步入文字处理器市场。现在这个市场看起来已经完全被微软所主宰。但是你看到了一群这样的人，不管出于什么样的理由，这些人对文字处理器的要求极端苛刻，他们绝对不能容忍文字处理器软件的崩溃。于是你就想创建一个超级健壮，工业级别的文字处理器。这种文字处理器从来不会崩溃。然后你就以溢价将这个软件卖给这些依赖于这种文字处理器生活的人们。（好吧，这很扯，不过我说过了这是个虚构的例子）

Now, your corporate culture probably includes all kinds of techniques for writing highly-robust code: unit testing, formal code reviews, coding conventions, large QA departments, and so on. These techniques are not trivial; they must be learned over a period of time. While a new programmer is learning how to write robust code, they need to be mentored and coached by someone more experienced.

于是你的企业价值可能就包含了各种各样的技术用于创作高度健壮的代码。单元测试，正式的代码审核，代码规范，大型的质量保证部门等等。这些技术都不是无关紧要的，这些技能都必须通过一段时间才能习得。当一个新人在学习如何编写健壮代码的时候，他们必须要有一个有经验的人来指导，教授他们。

As soon as you try to grow so fast that mentoring and coaching is impossible, you are simply going to stop transmitting those values. New hires won't know better and will write unreliable code. They won't check the return value from malloc(), and their code will fail in some bizarre case that they never thought about, and nobody will have time to review their code and teach them the right way to do it, and your entire competitive advantage over Microsoft Word has been squandered.

一旦你决定要迅速的增长，指导和教授就变得不可能了。于是，你就会停止向新进员工输送这种价值观。于是他们不懂的地方就更多，以后就会写出不可靠的代码。他们不会检查malloc函数的返回值。有时候他们编写的代码在一些他们从来没有考虑过的奇怪情况下会失效。然后也没有人会有时间去审核他们的代码并教授他们如何正确的去做这件事情。最后，你的整个相对于微软字处理器的竞争优势就全部被破坏掉了。

A company that is growing too fast will simply not notice when it makes a big mistake, especially of the spend-too-much-money kind. Amazon buys Junglee, a comparison shopping service, for around $180,000,000 in stock, and then suddenly realizes that comparison shopping services are not very good for their business, so they just shut it down. Having piles and piles of cash makes stupid mistakes easy to cover up.

那些增长的太快的公司根本不会注意到他们犯下巨大的错误。特别是那种花了很多钱犯那种错误。当亚马逊花了大约一亿八千万价值的股票买下Junglee（一家在线比购服务），然后突然意识到。在线比购服务对他们来说不是很重要，于是他们就把这个服务关停了。花费大笔大笔的金钱犯下的这种愚蠢错误很容易就被掩盖起来了。

Getting big fast gives the impression (if not the reality) of being successful. When prospective employees see that you're hiring 30 new people a week, they will feel like they are part of something big and exciting and successful which will IPO. They may not be as impressed by a "sleepy little company" with 12 employees and a dog, even if the sleepy company is profitable and is building a better long-term company.

快速增长给人一种（实际上并不是很现实）已经成功的感觉。当你的一些有见地的员工看到你一周新招三十个员工的时候，他们会感觉到这是一家很大的令人激动的成功公司，马上要进行首轮公开募资。这些人可能不会被那种令人厌倦的只有十二个员工和一条狗的小公司所打动，哪怕这种令人厌倦的小公司一直在盈利。而且是一家有着良好远期发展前景的公司。

A sleepy little company in Albuquerque

一家在阿尔伯克基的令人厌倦的小公司。

As a rule of thumb, you can make a nice place to work, or you can promise people they'll get rich quick. But you have to do one of those, or you won't be able to hire.

一个首要原则就是：你得创建另一个令人舒适的工作环境或者向每个人承诺他们都会很快致富。不管怎么样，你得做到两者之一，要不然你就招不到优秀的人。

Some of your employees will be impressed by a company with a high chance of an IPO that gives out lots of stock options. Such people will be willing to put in three or four years at a company like this, even if they hate every minute of their working days, because they see the pot at the end of the rainbow.

你的员工中有一部分人可能会痴迷于一种公司，这种公司有很大的可能马上要进行首轮公开募资上市，并且会分发大量股票期权。这些人会愿意在一个这样的公司花上三到四年。哪怕他们憎恨在那里工作的每一分钟，只因为他们看到了彩虹桥那端的天堂。

If you're growing slowly and organically, the pot may be farther off. In that case, you have no choice but to make a work environment where the journey is the reward. It can't be hectic 80 hour workweeks. The office can't be a big noisy loft jammed full of folding tables and hard wooden chairs. You have to give people decent vacations. People have to be friends with their co-workers, not just co-workers. Sociology and community at work matter. Managers have to be enlightened and get off people's backs, they can't be Dilbertesque micromanagers. If you do all this, you'll attract plenty of people who have been fooled too many times by dreams of becoming a millionaire in the next IPO; now they are just looking for something sustainable.

如果你的公司有机地慢慢地增长，其实在天堂并不遥远。在这种情况下，你别无他法必须要搭建一个这样的工作环境：使得这段旅途看起来就是报酬。当然不可能是每周繁忙的八十个小时工作。办公室也不应该巨大的嘈杂的隔间，里面充满了各种折叠桌和硬木椅。你得让员工体面的休假。员工们与他们的同事要成为朋友而不仅仅是同事。工作礼仪和社区至关重要，程序经理们必须善于启发，而不是只会碾压他们。程序经理不应该是迪尔伯特漫画中描述的那种微经理。如果你做到了所有这些。你就会吸引一大群那种已经被戏弄了若干次程序员。他们总是坐着下次公司公开上市就能够变成百万富翁美梦。但现在他们要寻找的就是一种可持续的模式。

With the Ben and Jerry's model, if you're even reasonably smart, you're going to succeed. It may be a bit of a struggle, there may be good years and bad years, but unless we have another depression, you're certainly not going to lose too much money, because you didn't put in too much to begin with.

采用本杰夫瑞模式，如果你足够聪明那么你就会成功。可能还是要一点点努力，还是会有一些挣扎。可能还是会有好的年景和坏的年景。除非我们迎来了又一轮新的经济大萧条。否则你不大可能损失一大笔钱。因为一开始的时候你就没有投入一大笔钱。

The trouble with the Amazon model is that all anybody thinks about is Amazon. And there's only one Amazon. You have to think of the other 95% of companies which spend an astonishing amount of venture capital and then simply fail because nobody wants to buy their product. At least, if you follow the Ben and Jerry's model, you'll know that nobody wants your product long before you spend more than one MasterCard's worth of credit limit on it.

亚马逊模式的问题在于：所有人思考的都是关于亚马逊，但是只有一个亚马逊。你应该考虑到其他的那些95%的公司。这些公司烧掉了风险投资一大笔钱，失败只是因为没有人会想要买他们的产品。但是至少如果你采用本杰瑞模式。那么在你烧掉一张万事达信用卡的透支限额之前，你就能知道没有人想购买你们的产品。

The Worst Thing You Can Do

你所能做的最坏的事情就是：

The worst thing you can do is fail to decide whether you're going to be a Ben and Jerry's company or an Amazon company.

你能做的最糟糕的事情就是：你错误地决定了应该采用本杰瑞模式还是亚马逊模式。

If you're going into a market with no existing competition, lock-in, and network effects, you better use the Amazon model, or you're going the way of Wordsworth.com, which started two years before Amazon, and nobody's ever heard of them. Or even worse, you're going to be a ghost site like MSN Auctions with virtually no chance of ever overcoming ebay. (Read Wordsworth's reply )

如果你要进入一个没有任何竞争的市场（这个市场没有任何网络效应没有任何锁定效应）的话，你最好采用亚马逊模式否则那你就会重蹈WordsWorth.com的覆辙，这家公司先于亚马逊两年起步，但是几乎没有人听说过。或者更糟：你的产品会成为一个无人访问的鬼站，就像MSN拍卖站那样根本没有任何可能超越ebay。（阅读Wordsworth公司的回复）

If you're going into an established market, getting big fast is a fabulous way of wasting tons of money, as did BarnesandNoble.com. Your best hope is to do something sustainable and profitable, so that you have years to slowly take over your competition.

如果你要进入一个已经建立的市场。迅速的扩大是烧钱的绝佳方式。就像BarnesandNoble.com所做的那样。你的最佳策略就是做一些可持续盈利的事情，这样你就可以有很长的时间来慢慢的取代你的竞争对手。

Still can't decide? There are other things to consider. Think of your personal values. Would you rather have a company like Amazon or a company like Ben and Jerry's? Read a couple of corporate histories -Amazon and Ben and Jerry's for starters, even though they are blatant hagiographies, and see which one jibes more with your set of core values. Actually, an even better model for a Ben and Jerry's company is Microsoft, and there are lots of histories of Microsoft. Microsoft was, in a sense, "lucky" to land the PC-DOS deal, but the company was profitable and growing all along, so they could have hung around indefinitely waiting for their big break.

还是没办法做决定？你还有其他东西要考虑，思考下你的个人价值观，你是想要一个亚马逊这样的公司呢还是想要一个本杰瑞一样的公司。对初创公司来说，可以阅读一些像是亚马逊和本杰瑞公司的历史传记。虽然这种东西读起来很明显的就像是圣人自传。但是你还是可以看看其中哪些废话更加符合你的价值观。实际上比本杰瑞公司模式更好的模式就是微软，网上有很多关于微软的历史，微软在某种程度上来说很幸运的圈住了PC-DOS这笔生意，但是这家公司能够持续盈利，并且一直在增长。所以他们可以一直有停顿。直到一些更大的错误出现。

Think of your risk/reward profile. Do you want to take a shot at being a billionaire by the time you're 35, even if the chances of doing that make the lottery look like a good deal? Ben and Jerry's companies are not going to do that for you.

思考一下你的风险回报偏好：你会想要在你35岁的时候成为一个亿万富翁么？哪怕这种概率让中六合彩都看起来可靠多了。本杰瑞这公司是不可能帮你达成这样的愿望的。

Probably the worst thing you can do is to decide that you have to be an Amazon company, and then act like a Ben and Jerry's company (while in denial all the time). Amazon companies absolutely must substitute cash for time whenever they can. You may think you're smart and frugal by insisting on finding programmers who will work at market rates. But you're not so smart, because that's going to take you six months, not two months, and those 4 months might mean you miss the Christmas shopping season, so now it cost you a year, and probably made your whole business plan unviable. You may think that it's smart to have a Mac version of your software, as well as a Windows version, but if it takes you twice as long to ship while your programmers build a compatibility layer, and you only get 15% more customers, well, you're not going to look so smart, then, are you?

可能最坏的事情就是你决定公司要成为一家亚马逊模式的公司，然后你公司却表现得像本杰瑞公司模式一样。（虽然一直不承认这种情地带这种情况）亚马逊类的公司绝对会在任何可能的情况下使用现金换取时间。你可能觉得你很聪明节俭，坚持你们公司要招市场价的程序员。但是你又没那么聪明。因为这样要花六个月的时间而不是两个月，这失去的四个月可能意味着：你会错过圣诞购物季；然后这又意味着：你可能又损失了一年；然后这又意味着你的整个计划可能都行不通了。你可能觉得为你的软件开发一个mac版本和一个Windows版本是很聪明的行为。但是考虑到如果这么做会让你的程序猿多花费很多时间来构建一个兼容层，这样发布时间又延长两倍。而这么做仅仅为你带来了额外的15%的客户。在这种情况下你绝对不可能看上去那么聪明。不是吗？

Both models work, but you've got to pick one and stick to it, or you'll find things mysteriously going wrong and you won't quite know why.

两种模式都行得通。但是你必须选择其中一种，并且坚持其中一种。否则你就会发现一些事情神秘的出错，然而你却不知道为什么？